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31 May - 2 June 2010

# Peace and Security Policy Briefing: A View from Europe

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View a gallery of photos from the meeting at:  
<http://picasaweb.google.com/carahmasu/Brussels20101?authkey=Gv1sRgCLWBobHos4vWZQ&feat=directlink>

## Conference Report

The **European Foundation Centre**, based in Brussels, and the **Peace and Security Funders Group**, based in the United States, jointly hosted a two-day meeting for more than 50 European and North American foundation representatives and funders during the **EFC's Foundation Week**. The meeting was organized with the substantive and financial support of the **Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies**, **Fondation Charles Leopold Mayer**, **Forum for a New World Governance** and the **Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust**. The following summary report is based on staff notes and was not reviewed by speakers. A list of attendees is available at: [http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/Registrants\\_Final.pdf](http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/Registrants_Final.pdf)

## Opening Speeches and Remarks

**Robert Cooper**, Director General for External Affairs and Political-Military Affairs at the **General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union**, opened the meeting with a dinner speech on 31 May that highlighted Europe's historic achievement of creating an ever-expanding zone of peace. As he eloquently remarked, "If you don't start with peace, you can't have anything else."

**Gerry Salole**, CEO of the **European Foundation Centre**, and **Katherine Magraw**, Director of the **Peace and Security Funders Group (PSFG)**, welcomed participants the following morning. Gerry spoke of his hopes that European funders will mobilize and work together with their colleagues at this historically important moment. He pointed to the Israeli attack on the Turkish flotilla bringing aid to the Gaza strip, which had occurred the previous night, to underscore the need for the international community to speak out. Gerry posited that there have been subtle, little-understood changes in world governance that call for a consortia of foundations working together if we are to advance international peace.



Katherine described the meeting's genesis and outlined its objectives. Several European participants in the PSFG briefing last year in Washington proposed a comparable briefing on EU policy and priorities in Europe for American and European foundations. A group of funders on both sides of the Atlantic seized on the idea as it furthered two long-standing objectives: to deepen the relationships between American and European funders, and to encourage the establishment of a European network of peace and security funders. The meeting was therefore designed to offer an information rich, top-down briefing on the critical issues facing European Union security policy and an overview of the major players and political considerations. The planners also hoped to facilitate relationship building and consideration of how we can further common objectives through coordination and partnerships.



## Keynote Address

**Louise Arbour**, President and CEO of **International Crisis Group**, posited that the first decade of 21st century began on 11 September 2001 and ended on 20 January 2009 with the election of Barack Obama. That decade was marked by an obsessive focus on security, defined in mostly American or Western terms. This meant a return to a narrow definition of security, relating mostly to terrorism and crime and to violent repression as the method for dealing with it. Arbour argued that security has a different connotation in most of the rest of the world. Women, in particular, understand that poverty, violence at home and lack of control are greater sources of insecurity than the threat of terrorism, despite the efforts of leaders to persuade them otherwise.

Arbour outlined three different sets of security challenges faced by Europe: first, the continued challenge posed by instability on the European continent itself; second, challenges posed in Europe's neighbourhood; and third, challenges to universal and European values and the impact of the erosion of those values on peace and security.

Although the EU represents a model for regional progress and security, peace in Europe itself is still threatened by Bosnia and Herzegovina's ongoing conflicts and lack of political development. The EU will continue to play a central role here as in the frozen conflict in Cyprus. Looking at the "wider" neighborhood, Russia faces intense internal difficulties. The challenge for the EU is to bring Russia closer to Europe without compromising on reform. Foundations working to strengthen Russian civil society also face challenges as the government is steadily closing the space in which non-governmental organisations, especially those with foreign funding, can operate. In Africa – also part of Europe's wider neighborhood -- overcoming state fragility is not only a moral imperative, but has implications for migration, trafficking of drugs, weapons

and people, encouraging terrorism, as well as for trade, and thus is imperative for European peace and stability. She concluded that the EU punches below its weight politically in Africa. Looking at universal values, Arbour focused on the International Criminal Court. Both Europe and Africa have overwhelmingly embraced the Court, and its underlying concept of accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. However, resistance from governments to accept accountability and responsibility limits Europe's ability to implement these values.

Arbour argued that civil society organizations and the foundations that support them can make a difference by raising global awareness of the risk of conflict, identifying policy responses and mobilising political will behind those responses. She concluded that within the EU, there is a dilemma between principled and pragmatic approaches that interferes with the EU's ability to move from genuine commitment to implementation. Europe cannot afford to remain the benign underwriter of some else's agenda, Arbour argued. Nor can it lead by bureaucratic brilliance. If it is to make its imprint on the next decade, Europe must pursue more forcefully the politics of inclusion that are the best prophylactic against deadly conflict.

**Read the written text of Louise Arbour's speech at:**

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/europes-peace-and-security-policies-and-capabilities.aspx>

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*"The last decade was marked by an American driven security agenda. Emerging powers are poised to enter the fray. Europe cannot afford to remain the benign underwriter of some else's agenda. Nor can it lead by bureaucratic brilliance. If it is to make its imprint of the next decade, it must pursue more forcefully the politics of inclusion that are the best prophylactic against deadly conflict."*

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## First Day Plenaries

**John Packer**, Professor and Director of the Human Rights Centre at **Essex University**, led off with a powerpoint presentation that provided a graphic display of the complexity of the EU bureaucracy. John identified the key challenges facing the EU, including turf wars between bureaucracies for resources and influence, the grossly disproportionate allocation of resources to military spending rather than alternative mechanisms to address peace and security needs, and the tensions between aid and trade.

John explained that the complex bureaucratic structure partly reflects the fact that the definition of peace is still evolving from the basic concept of peace as an absence of war – mostly an interstate paradigm -- to the more complex meaning in which there are multiple sources of tensions and conflict and non-state actors are both threats and forces for peace. Within Europe, John posited there is a tendency to rely on bureaucracies and to think in terms of charts and structures. The normative basis on which the bureaucracies are constructed originate from the moral mandate in the UN charter. While the United Nations Charter makes war unlawful, it recognizes that security challenges and threats remain and it establishes a right to self-defense. The EU thus has a basis for legitimacy in the regional arrangements recognized under Chapter Eight of UN charter, which authorizes it to act in cases of peace and security.

**Giji Gya**, Executive Director of the International Security Information Service, discussed how the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) architecture interacts with civil society. Operating under a human security framework, its primary mandates are emergency response, humanitarian aid, responding to conflict, and development. Within Development, the EUCFSP mandates include: Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR); Reconstruction;

Security Sector Reform; Disarmament (nonproliferation); Combating terrorism, trafficking, narcotics and piracy; Health and Education; Climate Change; and Energy Security. The main challenge to the common security and defense policy is bringing European countries together to make the EU a more common and cohesive body. A second major and recurring concern is how the EUCFSP interacts with the EU's trade objectives.

The session highlighted the importance of mandates in the EU and the concern about overstepping the limits of those mandates. Although there is some overlap in EU institutions, there remains a “silo mentality” that poses a significant challenge to policy and response coordination. In Europe, bureaucracies are developed to respond to threats and to enhance organizational structure and order.

**Nick Witney** from **European Council on Foreign Relations** and **Catherine Woollard**, Director of the **European Peacebuilding Liaison Office** provided an analysis of the effectiveness of EU institutions and their relationship to other international policymaking bodies. Whitney posited that the extent to which the EU underperforms as a security actor has three root causes: dysfunctional institutional set-up; lack of capacity to take action; and lack of political will.

The European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in 2003, identifies security threats from terrorism, proliferation and state failure, and it identifies the need to engage more effectively in troubled parts of the world. Europe needs to be more active, coherent and capable. The EU has had some clear successes, such as the EU monitoring mission in Georgia and its operation off the coast of Somalia. Today, there are more than 80,000 European troops deployed around the world in peacekeeping missions. However, only six operations have involved more than 1,000 troops on the ground.

The first two sessions were devoted to reaching an understanding of the development and roles of EU and European foreign policy agencies and institutions, and how civil society interacts with them.

**Download John Packer's powerpoint presentation at:**  
[http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/JPacker\\_presentation.pdf](http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/JPacker_presentation.pdf)

**Download Giji Gya's presentation at:**  
[http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/Gya\\_presentation.pdf](http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/Gya_presentation.pdf)



Nick Whitney and Celia McKeon listen to an intervention from Norine MacDonald.

## EU Institutions and Architecture (cont.)

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*“The extent to which the EU underperforms as a security actor has three root causes: disfunctional institutional set-up; lack of capacity to take action; and lack of political will.”*  
-Nick Whitney

Europe’s response to Georgia’s Rose Revolution was to send 10 judges, which was clearly an insufficient response. There has been little attempt to analyze or deal with the causes of the problems. The lack of a clear, shared understanding of policy provides excuses for capitals to not participate in missions. Reaching consensus of 27 individual states is a huge barrier to action. Moreover, it remains a general rule that the closer an issue comes to matters of war and peace, the more the decisions return to national capitals.

In terms of capacity, there has been free fall in defense budgets. The EU accounts for some 20% of the global defense expenditure, which is spent primarily on cold war military hardware. The EU has failed to modernize militarily, and while there are 1.5 million troops in Europe, 70% are not deployed outside of national territory. Whitney posited that in the area of military reform, the policy has been centered on preserving the status quo. He said defense is the last element of real pork in democracies, where one can look after jobs in marginal electoral constituencies. Whitney argued the EU needs to generate funds for joint endeavors, not only to commit troops, but also to foot the bill. He also suggested that resources be pooled to fight for European values in the world.

**Catherine Woollard** offered some history of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, which brings together a wide range of civil society organizations working on conflict prevention and peacebuilding to influence European peacebuilding strategy. She argued that little is understood about the role of nonstate actors in civil society and urged that civil society do more to present its role and provide credible options for peacebuilding.

Woollard reminded the participants of the ethical and legal grounds for EU efforts to contribute to conflict prevention and

peacebuilding in the Lisbon treaty. In addition, she argued that European citizens want the EU to be active outside of its borders for both ethical and hard security reasons.

However, the EU fails to fully use its leverage for several reasons. First, due to the proliferation of European actors, the EU requires a system of integration, not coordination, to avoid inefficiencies. Second, too often trade considerations trump all other issues. Third, it is easier to spend money on high profile international operations and the EU is not good at exploiting the political leverage that comes with its still substantial spending on development. In addition, accountability and oversight regarding EU peacebuilding funds is weak and in any case, only three percent of EU peacebuilding operations funds go to civil society. Lastly, coordination should be better between the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and EU peace operations. Woollard also pointed to the failure of the EU to implement meaningful gender policies, despite decent declaratory policies. For example, with regards to the appointment of senior EU personnel, only one female has been appointed head of the 27 CSDP missions and no female has been appointed to lead any of the 11 commissions.

Woollard said that Peacebuilding Liaison Office is working on a EU peacebuilding strategy to: provide more peacebuilding expertise in the EU External Action Service; advocate meaningful implementation on gender issues; bring peacebuilding and conflict prevention into EU programming; and implement existing commitments for peacebuilding. It is also reviewing the EU’s state-building strategy.

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*“European citizens want the EU to be active outside of its borders for both ethical and hard security reasons.”*  
-Catherine Woollard

## Lessons from the Balkans

Ivan Vejvoda, Director of the **Balkan Trust for Democracy** and Heather Grabbe, Director of the **Open Society Institute-Brussels**, provided analysis and lessons from the Balkans. Ivan offered some background on the Balkan Trust for Democracy. The United States Agency for International Development and the German Marshall Fund of the US each contributed \$10 million, and the C.S. Mott Foundation contributed \$5 million to establish and operate the Trust for the first ten years. The Trust spawned a network of actors that have in turn contributed to the peacebuilding effort and to stabilization. Five EU governments have also contributed: Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Czech Republic and the Netherlands. The Balkan Trust for Democracy disburses some \$3-4 million per year, mostly in small grants of \$25,000 and under. The European Fund for the Balkans does parallel work and is funded by the King Baudouin Foundation and an Austrian foundation. Both institutions employ local people and rely on people on the ground, governments and experts.

Ivan agreed with Louise Arbour that the situation remains politically difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but disagreed that it is “worse than it has ever been.” To the contrary, all of the democratically elected governments in the region have opted into the EU, will support each other in this movement and are committed to managing the conflict through peaceful means. Moreover, the countries are not close to going to war again.

However, as the major player and major donor in the region, Europe needs to do a better job handling existing challenges, for example in Kosovo where political institutions are not fully functioning. Ultimately, Europe also needs the US and NATO, as well as implementing agencies on the ground and private

foundations, such as OSI, in this long-term endeavor to help the region become stable and integrated into Europe. Ivan argued that civil society has played an important role, particularly in Kosovo, where it has conducted oversight of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo among other important tasks. Ivan concluded that it’s important to see this unfinished mission through to completion for inherent reasons and because of the wider example of post-conflict transformation it will provide.

**Heather Grabbe** argued that the possibility of EU membership provides the EU with significant leverage to encourage changes in the region, but that EU leverage is most effective when EU membership policy is consistent, credible and causes competition. Work is needed in all three areas. Consistency requires the EU to speak with one voice – which doesn’t always happen – and to put its money where its mouth is. Civil society also needs to have a consistent policy if it is to hold governments accountable for meeting Europe’s demands.

Grabbe said that the real value of the accession process is that it encourages long-term planning. However, since sustaining motivation during a long process can be a problem, the EU also must offer the governments of the Balkans interim and short-term rewards if the long-term promise is to remain credible. Finally, EU leverage works when it sets up positive competition among governments all seeking accession.



Ivan Vejvoda and Heather Grabbe.

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*“EU leverage is most effective when EU membership policy is consistent, credible and causes competition.”*  
-Heather Grabbe

## Lessons from Afghanistan

**Ambassador Francesc Vendrell**, Former EU Special Representative for Afghanistan, provided an overview of both the EU's and the US's numerous failures in Afghanistan. Vendrell argued that the US and EU ignored Pakistan's role in 2001 and in 2006 when it was evident that the Taliban was finding refuge in Pakistan. The US, in particular, also failed to continue to engage with Iranian officials on how best to get rid of the Taliban. Moreover, the US was overly optimistic that Afghanistan would be a success story and turned its attention to Iraq. The US and UN assumed without evidence that stability in Afghanistan could be established and that justice would follow.

Vendrell also highlighted numerous tactical and strategic errors. Coalition forces agreed to a highly centralized government system in Afghanistan, which has been utterly unable to meet the aspirations of the Afghan people. The US has confused means and objectives throughout and failed to perform careful planning. The EU and UN's unwillingness to commit adequate troops and resources at the outset also contributed to the poor current situation. The Western powers have been unwilling or unable to make course corrections. Finally, Amb. Vendrell suggested that the failure to resolve the conflict is rooted in US decisions to establish a regional power center, and its predisposition to accept and encourage coups and military regimes.

**Clare Lockhart**, CEO of the **Institute for State Effectiveness**, posited that while Afghanistan is called an eight-year war in the US, from the perspective in Afghanistan it was a three-week war and then a six-year humanitarian effort. During the 2001-2005 period under UN leadership, regional diplomacy and a focus on economics and job creation were successful in building trust between constituencies and rebuilding the country. Donors pooled their money and were sensitive to unique Afghan and Islamic needs. While much was accomplished during this period, Afghanistan is again at a crossroads as counterinsurgents and the Taliban have gained power.

By 2005, the coalition forces failed to understand the red lines, to adopt a human rights perspective, or to realize there can be no peace without justice. Some 60% of country is under 25 and they weren't alive during the jihad of 1980s. The forces on the ground did not try to create a new generation of leaders and the civil service collapsed. The special representatives of the UN Secretary General who put together peace agreements "forgot about the economy" and the result was disaffected youth and high unemployment. Nor did they help to create a regional diplomatic strategy. Presidential discussions did not even include a state-building strategy.

The country faces disintegration if the security and economic situation continue their downward trend. Lockhart argued that an institution-building approach is urgently needed, including investment in a civil service. Similarly, we must invest in secondary and tertiary education and training. The economy has been neglected, not in terms of aid, but rather in terms of the political economy and this must be corrected. People have also been neglected as evidenced by the fact that there is not yet a population-centered development strategy. Finally, we still lack sufficient investment in early-warning systems.

There are reasons to be hopeful. At least 90% of the Afghan population deeply desire peace. The current counterinsurgency strategy is explicitly designed to protect the population. And the rediscovery of the enormous wealth in the country – recent estimates are that Afghanistan has some \$1-3 trillion in mineral resources – could mean that Afghanistan can pay its own costs.

Lockhart argued, as opposed to Amb. Vendrell, that the US military is engaged in concerted effort to learn the lessons of its failed approach. Policymakers within the US State Department and USAID also are trying to make significant changes, as indicated in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. But these changes will take several years, if not decades to implement. Moreover, the US still does not have a coherent development strategy for investing in Afghan institutions and people. Lockhart is also sceptical that the strategy will be articulated on the basis of values and morals, and an understanding of the underlying causes and grievances that allowed the Taliban movement to take root. Finally, if there is going to be engagement with the Taliban, it must be clear what the objectives and the red lines of the talks are.

Lockhart believes that Afghanistan will not turn the corner without mobilization of foundations and civil society, which can contribute by articulating an agenda for engagement that is focused on the vulnerable, marginalized and excluded. Foundations can also mobilize actions on the basis of a moral imperative. Funding could be provided to support civil society groups who demand government accountability and adherence to human rights. Foundations can support work that proposes alternative ideas to broaden the agenda of peacebuilding, including an examination of root causes of conflict. Finally, foundations can support the next generation of leaders that can change government politics.

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## Reception with JUANES

Following the information rich briefing during the day, participants enjoyed an evening reception featuring **Juanes**, Colombian artist, winner of 17 Latin Grammy awards, peace activist and founder of **Fundación Mi Sangre**. **Catalina Cock**, Executive Director of Fundación Mi Sangre, provided some background on the foundation's work and **Leonie van Mierlo** from **War Child Holland** presented the work of her foundation, before Juanes and his keyboardist treated the guests to several songs. Watch a video from the reception at:

[http://www.youtube.com/user/EuroFoundationCentre - p/u/22/xT-ljbXs\\_cs](http://www.youtube.com/user/EuroFoundationCentre - p/u/22/xT-ljbXs_cs)




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*"I feel the necessity to help my people because music has given me a lot and I see a way to help through music and art. We use art and music in our foundation programs so kids can become peacebuilders."*  
 Juanes

## Breakout Sessions on Drivers of Contemporary Conflict

The second day of the briefing began with a breakout session on EU responses to drivers of contemporary conflict. **Hans Joachim Giessmann**, Director of **Berghof Conflict Research**, provided background and facilitated a discussion on political violence and the discourse on Terrorism. **Download the presentation at:**

[http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/EFG\\_Terrorism.pdf](http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/EFG_Terrorism.pdf). **Paul Holtom**, Director of the Arms Transfers Programme at the **Stockholm International Peace Research Institute** (SIPRI), briefed participants on the arms trade and proliferation of small arms. **Download the presentation at:** [http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/HOLTOM\\_paper.pdf](http://peaceandsecurity.org/394/HOLTOM_paper.pdf). **Gustavo Marin**, Program Officer of **Mayer Foundation** and Director of the **Forum for a New World Governance**, facilitated a discussion on competition over resources and marginalized populations.

## Day Two Plenary

**Gerard Chaliand**, writer and consultant to the French government, made a presentation on changing geopolitics in a multipolar world, examining changing relations with China, Russia, Brazil and other rising powers from a European perspective. Chaliand reminded participants that history did not begin with the Second World War and the US and EU are not at the center of the world. Citing the recent diplomatic initiative from Turkey and Brazil to help resolve the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, Chaliand said that countries that were powerful in the 17th and 18th century are re-emerging. And, of course, we are now witnessing the rise of China. However, Gerard argued the U.S. will remain the overwhelming world military power for the foreseeable future. With the use of multiple

maps, Chaliand showed how the U.S. military has encircled and/or blocked all maritime checkpoints, strategic chokepoints, vital areas and countries, such as Iran.

Today, powers face asymmetric war where one side often enjoys technological superiority and the other greater ideological motivation. The side with the most motivated ideology is the probable victor. This is related to a transformation in Western public opinion about war – the pervasive fear of casualties in war has caused the West and the US to limit direct combat and to rely increasingly on advanced technology. Chaliand pointedly remarked that this aversion to casualties does not extend to "enemy" dead and wounded.



Arnaud Blin introduces Gerard Chaliand.

## Wrap-Up

### Planning Group

**Arnaud Blin**

Fondation Charles  
Leopold Mayer &  
Forum for a New  
World Governance

**Katherine Magraw**

Peace and Security  
Fundors Group

**Conrad Martin**

Stewart R. Mott  
Foundation

**Celia McKeon**

Joseph Rowntree  
Charitable Trust

**Micheline Mardulyn**

Fondation Bernheim

**Carl Robichaud**

Carnegie Corporation  
of NY

**Sevdalina Rukanova**

European Foundation  
Centre

**George Vickers**

Open Society Institute

**Johannes Zundel**

Berghof Foundation  
for Conflict Studies

**Christopher Harris**, Director of the **Working Group of Philanthropy for Social Justice and Peace**, and **Avila Kilmurray**, Director of the **Community Foundation for Northern Ireland**, led the final discussion session on European and American peace and security philanthropy.

**Harris** offered key themes and insights from the various sessions, which are reflected in the above summaries. He argued that funding for peace and security is woefully inadequate, and relatively low compared with other urgent issues, and challenged the group to consider how to bring more funders into the field and increase the total resources available. He suggested we need to talk to foundations outside of the usual circles and develop creative ways to reach out to individuals and foundations. Peace and security funders have gotten lazy about finding new partners, he argued.

**Avila Kilmurray** posed the questions foundations should be asking about the EU peace and security architecture: Who are the agents? Do they have the resources and knowledge to make the proposals? Who do you call in Europe? Apart from a general consensus on eliminating violence, do we agree on problems that should be addressed? Kilmurray also noted the challenges facing the architecture: bureaucracy upon bureaucracy; statism; weak institutional memory in constant flux; limited staying power; the prioritization of initiatives over programmatic work; and the lack of political will. Funders can turn these obstacles into opportunities by offering a framework for a policy of understanding. Philanthropy can bring evidence-based journeys, analyses from interventions, and more theoretical insights.

Kilmurray offered her experience as an indigenous funder in Northern Ireland. People in the community feel disempowered when they are sitting amidst conflict and need knowledge from others who have experienced conflict in order to find an alternative. Peacebuilding

is long-term and uncertain by its very nature and it is a prime area for philanthropic intervention. Furthermore, Kilmurray posited that foundations need to be conscious of the inconvenient truths and have the ability to speak those truths to power.

Finally, Kilmurray noted the absence of a network for European funders to talk to each other about peace and security issues such as exists in North America (the PSFG). The EFC has provided support for convening funders, but it cannot provide an ongoing structure. Kilmurray noted that foundations would need to settle several issues on the path to creating such a network: What is the best model of coordination? Do we have a common understanding of issues? Is there a meaningful gender perspective? How committed are we to being learning organizations? Are we prepared to make space for foundations that have peace and security as a secondary concern? Most importantly: Is a European group of peace and security funders an idea whose time has come, Kilmurray asked.

In the discussion that followed, several participants voiced their strong support for establishment of a European network. **Sevdalina Rukanova** said the **European Foundation Centre** will support and help facilitate a European funders network, but it cannot be the driver. **Katherine Magraw** said PSFG can help foster the process of creating a network of European foundations by including them in PSFG's communications, including the email newsletter and announcements, and in activities.

Participants also agreed that the planning group – along with any new volunteers – should consider how to further the discussions and relationships developed at this meeting. The planning group will look forward to considering the results of a meeting evaluation to be included in a follow-up mailing to all participants.

Watch a short interview of  
Avila Kilmurray from EFC's  
Foundation Week:

<http://www.youtube.com/user/EuroFoundationCentre - p/u/25/cNhohl2ey2Q>

Part of [EFC Foundation Week](#)

(<http://www.efc.be/foundationweek>):